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Abstract 
 
 
The presence of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) in armed 
conflicts pose a series of problems for third countries, 
they become involved even though their country is not 
one of the warring parties. FTF cannot be ignored 
because of its association with the activities of 
international terrorist networks. The paper begins with a 
brief overview on how FTF is becoming a burning issue 
in Indonesia's national security. This paper argues that, 
globalization has played part in terms of making 
terrorism and radicalization spread easily throughout the 
world, including Indonesia. Hence, fighting terrorism in 
both the traditional or contemporary forms is not an easy 
task anymore. While tackling any practices of terrorism 
and radicalism is a main priority for many countries 
around the world, the growing number of FTF in recent 
years is a clear impact of unfinished government’s effort 
of fighting terrorism that already growing beyond 
borders. This paper uses qualitative method and the data 
analysis was undertaken using phenomenology approach. 
This paper then reflects the complexity of how Indonesia 
facing its citizen who come back to the country as ISIS 
returning fighters. It concludes by analyzing the problem 
of fighting FTF returnees in Indonesia and suggesting 
how dealing with FTF returnees can be more effective by 
considering both domestic and regional factors. 
 
© 2019 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia and New Threats of Terrorism  
In the process of globalization and the 
increasing development of transportation, 
not only facilitates the movement of goods 
but also the movement of people or services 
from one country to another. This causes the 
phenomenon of a movement carried out by 
various nations with the destination to many 
countries in the world. This kind of 
movement is often referred to as migration. 
Many of migration started and occurred 
motivated of pursuing a better welfare. 
Aside for seeking of better wellbeing, there 
are other reasons of migration such as 
conflict, war, avoiding repressive power 
and even as a result of natural causes such 
as climate change that cause migration 
(Santoso, 2014). 
There are three known types of 
migration in international migration which 
are immigration, emigration and 
remigration. Immigration is the condition 
where the movement of people is from 
origin country to another country where the 
person is not a citizen of the destination 
country, for example Afghan citizens who 
enter Indonesia. Whereas emigration is an 
immigration activity with the perspective of 
the origin country, for example Indonesians 
who travel abroad. While remigration is the 
movement of the residents to travel back to 
the origin country.  
In Indonesia, the immigration cases are 
also expected to ascend due to the 
emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) groups phenomenon which 
have controlled numerous areas in Syria 
and Iraq (“Bagaimana kelompok jihadis 
ISIS terbentuk?,” 2014). Basically Foreign 
Terrorist Fighter (FTF) is not a new 
phenomenon, FTF has been known since 
the Spanish Civil War and the war in 
Afghanistan at the time after the Soviet 
invasion of 1989. But the term FTF became 
prominent after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
against the United States. This is because 
the FTF or the emergence of foreign 
fighters in the area of Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. The existence of ISIS group 
even triggered large numbers of 
Indonesians to pledge allegiance to the 
Khilafah or caliphate movement that ISIS 
promoted and decided to migrate to Syria 
and other neighboring areas to join the 
movement.  The involved FTF are typically 
in their mid-20s’ and only a few of them are 
middle-aged. Moreover, ISIS FTFs are not 
only dominated by men but also women. 
Despite the limitations of the data, but many 
found that it is not uncommon that ISIS FTF 
also associated with the recidivists from 
radical movements. This argument proved 
that FTF is strongly linked with terrorism 
activity in their own country (McVeigh, 
2014). 
FTF were different from or mercenary 
members of a private company's security 
personnel. This is because the mercenaries 
or private security personnel hired and 
recruited legal and not prohibited by the 
state. While FTFs are usually not motivated 
by material but comes from a sense of 
empathy on an equality. Thus, the foreign 
fighters are defined as individuals who join 
the revolt abroad with the primary 
motivation or religious ideology and not 
merely economics (Hegghammer, 2010). 
There are at least two reasons why people 
all around the world are inclined to join the 
ISIS or even decided to out of the country 
as FTF. Firstly, the narrative and 
propaganda built by ISIS to recruit FTFs 
has motivated people to be sympathetic 
with this movement and aspire with 
khilafah ideas. Even so for some people 
who were disposed by the propaganda 
thought that it was another way of Jihad. 
Secondly, they are tempted by the money or 
salary promised by ISIS. ISIS is predicted 
to be able to provide a salary of US $ 400-
500 per month per one member (Colgan, 
2011). In this regard, globalization poses 
not only the positive impact but also brings 
the negative consequence. These 
immigration and remigration activities have 
developed a new problem, not only for 
Indonesia, but also to many countries in the 
world. The cause of the problem is related 
with  citizens  who  have  become ISIS FTF 
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and already migrated to Syria or another 
country but trying return to Indonesia or do 
remigration to their origin country. The 
ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters who returns 
to origin country are also called ISIS 
Returnee (Santoso, 2014). 
Despite its challenges, Indonesia has 
been so persistence to build a set of policies 
for facing the ISIS returnees. One of the 
main consideration of Indonesia's 
contribution in facing the ISIS returnee is 
due to the geopolitical complexity related to 
this issue. While Indonesia has national 
interest as a global maritime axis, the border 
between the Sulu sea and Sulawesi posed a 
vulnerable threat as an area for distributing 
illegal forces which are indicated as 
potential FTF and as a area for weapons 
circulation. The borders, such as the border 
between the Sulu sea and Sulawesi, with a 
large degree of proximity not only become 
the area for distributing illegal forces, but 
also illegal weapons. Besides the 
geopolitical consideration, Indonesia is also 
weighing on the  number of Indonesian ISIS 
returnees. It is known that Among 
Indonesian who joined as ISIS FTFs in 
Syria, 77 of them have died while fighting 
and 61 people have returned to Indonesia. 
This is thought to be the most dangerous 
threat to Indonesia because Indonesia 
government cannot afford have risk of 61 
Indonesians with the ability to use military 
weapons and has possibility to carry out 
acts of terror in Indonesia (Simbolon, 
2017). There are even some foreign terrorist 
fighters who carried out the attack without 
being ordered to do by their networks, it is 
commonly called the "blowback" action 
(Byman & Shapiro, 2014). Seeing how 
diverse the ISIS returnee issue could give 
impact to Indonesia’s security and defense 
condition, Indonesia must begin 
immediately to implement its strategies 
effectively. Therefore, this paper intends to 
examine further Indonesia’s strategy to face 
the ISIS returnees. 
 
The Impact of ISIS Existence to 
Indonesia 
Daesh or ISIS who carried out resistance in 
Iraq and Syria succeeded in provoking, 
inviting, attracting foreign fighters from all 
over the world who share the same 
ideological views as them. The United 
Nations (UN) report said ISIS militants had 
300 thousand foreign fighters from 100 
countries (Amanda, 2015). It can be seen in 
Figure 1 that the number of FTFs 
successfully recruited by ISIS came mostly 
from the Middle East, North Africa and 
Western Europe and the origin country are 
mostly from Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia 
and Tunisia. In the Southeast Asia region, 
Figure 1. Numbers of foreign fighters traveling to join the so-called Islamic State and other violent 
extremist groups in Iraq and Syria 
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the number of FTFs continues to increase in 
line with the upheaval condition in the 
Philippines. In addition to the spread of 
ideology, ISIS is also affiliated with anti-
government movements in the Southeast 
Asian region, such as the movement that 
took place in the Southern Philippines, 
which is predominantly a political 
subversion. In the case of Southern 
Philippines, there are groups who is using 
diplomatic politics, but some also carry out 
acts of terror.  Internal conflicts in the 
southern Philippines began with the birth of 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
(MILF) group followed the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and now a 
separatist Islamist group with the name 
Maute affiliated with ISIS has emerged. 
The Maute group cross the terrorist network 
map since May 2017 when pledging 
allegiance with ISIS.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS  
It can be seen from Table 1 that even though 
Indonesia is not the highest origin country 
of ISIS FTF but Indonesia is also a country 
with a large number of FTF contributors, 
with a total of 1139 people involved in the 
FTF at the early of 2017. Both living, dead 
and not yet identified whereas the numbers 
were 524 men and 147 women. 
According to the author from the Center 
for Terrorist Studies and Social Conflict at 
the Faculty of Psychology, University of 
Indonesia, Solahudin, there are at least five 
main reasons that encourage Indonesian to 
enter the conflict area. Firstly, to defend 
Sunni groups who were oppressed by the 
Shiites. The public believes that Syrian 
leader President Bashar al-Assad, backed 
by Shiites are discriminating Sunni groups. 
Some parties even believe that the only 
group has the ability to fight Bashar al-
Assad is ISIS. Second, they believe that the 
Syrian region will be the location of the 
apocalypse war or al-malhamah al-kubra. 
Their belief is based on the hadith which 
states that the war of the end-of-the-world 
will occur around the area, namely in Syria 
or the area around Syria, Lebanon and 
Palestine. Third, people were tempted to 
leave because they saw ISIS as the most 
committed group to enforcing Islamic law. 
Fourth, there is propaganda that people who 
is defending ISIS will get a reward and live 
in a five-star lifestyle. Life will also be 
guaranteed such as getting a big salary, the 
wife gets compensation, free apartments, 
gasoline, and even healthcare is free. Lastly, 
there is also a reason that people who join 
ISIS missed being under the auspices of the 
Caliphate (Ansyari, S., and Wicaksono, 
2016). 
In addition, the increase of FTF 
originating from Indonesia is due to many 
being deceived by ISIS propaganda videos. 
One of the visual propaganda carried out by 
ISIS members through online media, 
namely youtube that published in 2014 with 
the title "Join The Ranks", gave rise to a 
man identified as an Indonesian citizen 
named Bahrumsyah a.k.a Abu Muhammad 
al-Indonesiy. In the video, he took 
provocative actions through da’wah 
messages in the form of hijrah, jihad and 
daulah using Indonesian language. The 
main message contained in the video is 
asking  for  support  for the ISIS struggle to 
 
Table 1. Indonesian citizens involved in the FTF per January 2017 
No Category Male Female TOTAL 
1 Indonesian in Syria 403 114 517 
2 Indonesian Deceased in  Syria 75 1 76 
3 Indonesian Deported by Foreign Countries  183 115 298 
4 Indonesian Failed to Depart from Indonesia 42 21 63 
5 Indonesian Planned to go to Syria 81 32 111 
6 Indonesian Returnees 55 5 60 
7 ISIS - affiliated foreigners who came to Indonesia 12 - 12 
 Total Number of Indonesian Citizens involved with ISIS 851 288 1139 
Source: The National Agency for Combating Terrorism (2017)
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become a world khilafah and an invitation 
to join and jihad with ISIS (Dewi, 2018). 
Head of the National Counter Terrorism 
Agency (NCTA) since 2016, Police 
Commissioner General Drs. Suhardi Alius, 
MH invited Southeast Asian countries to 
increase awareness of foreign terrorist 
threats after the Philippine military 
operation in Marawi against armed groups 
suspected from the ISIS terrorist network. 
While there are also a number of Indonesian 
FTFs who were prominent with the Maute 
front in Marawi. 
Based on the news of the arrest of 12 
Indonesian citizens in Turkey who are 
strongly suspected of joining ISIS, consists 
of a group of mothers and children who 
intend to follow her husband who is already 
in Syria. They were deported by the Turkish 
government    and     recognized    by     the 
Indonesian government to take steps to 
assist or going through the deradicalization. 
A total of 217 Indonesian citizens were 
arrested and deported because they were 
indicated to be involved in terrorist 
networks.   According   to   the  Director of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection of Indonesian Citizens and BHI 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia, Muhammad Iqbal, 
217 Indonesian citizens who were arrested 
came from 7 different countries namely; 2 
Indonesia Citizens from Saudi Arabia,  200 
Indonesian Citizens from Turkey, 3 
Indonesian Citizens from Malaysia, 2 
Indonesian Citizens from Japan, 1 
Indonesian Citizen from Sudan, and 4 
Indonesian citizens from Singapore. All 
those 217 Indonesian citizens allegedly 
related to FTF activities (Gabrillin, 2016). 
Another incident is when The Philippine 
National Police (PNP) released the names 
of dozens of members of the Maute militant 
group who invaded Marawi City, Southern 
Philippines. Seven of them are known as 
Indonesian citizens (Movanita, 2017). 
Related to this incident, Indonesia’s 
Immigration Director General Ronny 
Sompie said that his office, namely the 
Directorate General of Immigration, was 
ready to revoke the passport of the people 
who were on the search list, including 
suspected terrorists who were on the list of 
deterred people. Ronny emphasized that the 
revocation of Indonesian citizens' passports 
Figure 2. Indonesian FTF involved in Marawi Incident 
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whose  involved in acts of terror would 
make the repatriation action easier. So then 
the Indonesian police and the NCTA could 
easily examine them (Saputra, 2016). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Indonesia’s Challenge for Regulating 
ISIS Returnees  
Basically to regulate ISIS FTF can not be 
done individually by each country because 
the FTF phenomenon involving at least 
three countries, that is country of origin, 
transit country and destination country. 
Therefore, there is no single country can 
solve its own problems related to FTF and 
the need for cooperation in handling. FTF 
countermeasures regulation in Indonesia 
has been implemented by the government; 
especially by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Ministry of Politics, Law and Security of 
the Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian 
National Police along with the task force in 
charge, namely Densus 88, the National 
Agency for Combating Terrorism and the 
Directorate General of Immigration. 
Compared to other terrorism issues, the 
activity of ISIS is considered as an anomaly 
due to its expansion outside of Iraq and 
Syria. ISIS also brought the FTF not only 
from countries that are geographically close 
to Iraq and Syria such as Yemen, 
Afghanistan and East Africa, but also range 
from country with low number of muslim 
population like Europe. Initially, based on 
geopolitically perspective, ISIS might not 
be a dangerous threat to Indonesia, but due 
to its significant development from the base 
of supporters and flow of funding, it grow 
as a tangible threat to Indonesia. 
Moreover, in its development, 
ideological differences and lack of 
understanding about the caliphate has 
significantly influenced the decision of 
FTFs. The FTF somehow posed to options 
whereas they able to return to their origin 
country or to another third country, whether 
for peaceful purposes or with the intention 
of carrying out a terrorist attack. Regardless 
of the option to live in a other terror groups 
bases or join other terrorist organizations 
and continue to fight in other conflict areas. 
Currently, around 15.000 FTFs are 
identified to be in Syria and Iraq. The 
number of ISIS returnees, especially 
originating from Indonesia, is expected to 
increase. At present, there are 6 returnees 
who have their movements monitored. 
Hundreds of Libyan FTF have also returned 
from the Iraqi or Syrian battlefield to join 
ISIS in Libya which seems to be a strategic 
step to expand the organization's global 
footprint (Van Ginkel, B., 2016). 
Unpredicted various motivations of ISIS 
FTF to return to its origin country is also an 
obstacle in anticipating the regulation for its 
movement. Some may feel practically 
incompatible with the act of terror and not 
ready for brutality or the cruelty that they 
have seen and carried out by the ISIS. While 
others are merely disappointed with life 
they have under ISIS leadership because it 
is not in accordance with their previous 
expectations (Neumann, 2015). However, 
other people notoriously returned to their 
origin countries with the intention and 
ability to carry out terrorist attacks in their 
country. This is shown as the evidence of 
how the systematic export of terror is also a 
new element in ISIS strategy. 
The dilemma posed by FTF issue is also 
because the nationality of the FTF has an 
important role in determining whether an 
individual is protected by their country or 
not. If civilians were involved in the conflict 
for ISIS, consequently their immunity will 
be lost as citizen for certain country for 
engaging in war crimes (Sassòli, 2006). 
However, if a citizen trapped in the ISIS 
conflict occurred in foreign conflict 
territory and they have qualification as legal 
citizens, then these individuals still have the 
right to be protected by their country 
through their diplomatic representatives. 
Despite the international law applied, there 
is still a lot of debates about the FTF 
returnees.  Some countries argue that the 
law applied for those returnees can no 
longer based on nationality alone but should 
also look on the basis of their ideology. This 
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kind of debate then raised a tricky situation 
in the international community because 
many countries are then reluctant to provide 
protection (Goldsmith, 2004).  
Thus, preventing the Indonesian 
Community from joining ISIS as an FTF 
has been a challenge for Indonesia’s 
government. Despite the challenge that the 
government face, the Indonesian 
government is persistent to made effort and 
program to eradicate the impact that FTF 
returnees could create. Some policies that 
Indonesia has implemented such as; 
revocation of citizens' passports that has 
traveled to countries affiliated to ISIS, 
submitted changes of Law No. 15 of 2003 
concerning the Eradication of Terrorism 
Crimes in order to accommodate 
sympathizers or supporters for terrorist 
movements abroad (Waluyo, 2015). 
However, regulating ISIS returnees has not 
been an easy task, rather its dillematic. One 
of the reasons is that the Indonesian citizens 
who went abroad to reach their aspiration as 
FTFs do not directly go from Indonesia to 
the destination country. Nonetheless, some 
have transit first to neighboring countries 
such as Singapore or Malaysia and then go 
to Turkey to cross the border of Syria. The 
proof of that event is found from Indonesian 
citizens which deported from these transit 
countries because they are captured when 
trying to cross the border to Syria to become 
FTF. 
To overturn the development of the ISIS 
FTF movement, many countries have taken 
different and varied countermeasures. 
Especially when considering the potential 
risks posed by ISIS returnees which creates 
more threat to returnees’ origin countries. 
The risk itself is proved by the involvement 
of many ISIS returnees’ in planning, 
recruiting, facilitating or even carrying out 
attacks in various acts of terror that 
previously occurred in their origin 
countries; such as in Paris, Brussels, 
Istanbul and Jakarta. Although, previous 
acts of terror that brought by ISIS returnees 
considered as soft targets, in which the 
combination of the use of low-tech tactics 
and easy-to-access targets provides a 
distinct obstacle for the adequate protection 
of public space. 
Knowing this circumstance, Indonesia 
then established various collaborations with 
neighboring countries to tackle terrorism, 
specifically which related to FTF issues. 
Starting from the Trilateral Meeting on 
Security in Manila on June 22, 2017, in 
which the forum discussed specifically 
about the Marawi conflict and other 
security issues in Southeast Asia. Indonesia 
also joined the Working Group on 
Combating International Terrorism which a 
cooperation of many agencies that tackle 
the problem of terrorism in their respective 
country. Beside also join ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on The Rise of 
Radicalization, where at the meeting there 
were several issues discussed, namely the 
sensitivity of the Marawi subject for the 
Philippines, strengthening the exchange of 
information and intelligence between 
ASEAN members, supervision and security 
of border areas including border control, 
and preventing/ countering violent 
extremism including addressing the root 
causes and underlying factors of the 
terrorism. Related to that agenda, many 
countries found confusion when 
terminologies like radicalist, terrorist and 
extremist put in one sentence. 
In conjunction with regional 
cooperation, Indonesia also maintaining 
cooperation by hosting the International 
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism (IMCT) in 
Nusa Dua, Bali with On August 10, 2016. 
More than 300 participants which 
represented 21 countries and three 
international organizations attended the 
meeting. The participating countries are 
Australia,     United       States,       Belgium, 
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Figure 3. Map of Militant Group Operations in the Philippines 
Source: Asia Times, 2017 
 
Netherlands, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Philippines, United Kingdom, India, 
Indonesia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, France, Russia, 
China, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam and three 
international organizations; namely ASEAN, 
The International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), and the UN. The 
meeting was held because the Indonesian 
government has special awareness in the new 
dynamics of international terrorism, 
especially the challenges faced by various 
countries associated with the movement of 
terrorists and arms trafficking, explosives, 
information, and funds across borders. The 
Indonesian government through the 
Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs, Agency for Anti-Terrorism 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will hold 
the IMCT alongside the Second Financing 
Summit of Counter-Terrorism held by the 
Financial Transaction Reports Indonesia and 
Analysis Center (PPATK) and Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC) colleagues in Australia. IMCT 
meeting will consist of the Ministerial 
Meeting with the theme of Fighting Cross-
Border Terrorism and Panel Dialogue which 
discussed the issue of de-radicalization and 
Foreign Terrorist Fighters and chaired by the 
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs, Wiranto. Indonesia’s 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will also 
attend the meeting. The meeting produced a 
Statement by the Chairman as a result of the 
strengthening of international cooperation to 
combat terrorism (Kementerian Luar Negeri 
Republik Indonesia, 2016).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Syrian conflict has triggered the 
involvement of Foreign Terrorist Fighter 
(FTF) from various countries, including 
Indonesia. The ISIS group received 
sympathetic support from radical groups in 
Indonesia, as well as direct support by joining 
the ISIS group and turn themselves into the 
FTF. This condition certainly raise concern of 
the Indonesian government because the 
radical notions campaigned by this group can 
pose a threat to security and unity in 
Indonesia. The government declared that the 
ISIS organization is a banned organization 
and prohibited Indonesian citizens from 
joining ISIS. 
The phenomenon of many Indonesian 
joined or even only sympathized with the ISIS 
movement and departing for Syria is certainly 
not in accordance with the ideology of the 
Indonesia as a nation which is Pancasila. The 
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Indonesian government has proved that they 
are not remaining silent facing this situation. 
The government also stated that the ISIS 
group is a terrorist organization and has been 
misusing the religion as their motive, hence 
the public is strictly prohibited from 
supporting or joining. The Indonesian 
government's efforts to prevent the access of 
people in terrorist activities, especially if they 
are previously known as FTF, have been 
carried out. Even though there are still a few 
Indonesian people who leave for Iraq and 
Syria or a number of people from Uighurs 
ethnic who join terrorist groups in Indonesia 
such as the East Indonesia Mujahidin group 
led by Santoso (Santoso, 2014) (Edward, 
2014). 
Some suggestions for optimizing 
coordination between institutions in 
preventing ISIS FTF from returning to 
Indonesia, for example involving the function 
of BNPT as the main element in national 
defense that is responsible for protecting the 
country from the threat of terrorism can be 
increased with synergy with other 
government agencies. In addition, other 
institutions such as Immigration Directorate, 
National Police and Indonesian Military 
(TNI) are the leading institutions in 
preventing Indonesian citizens from leaving 
and becoming FTFs. In dealing with ISIS 
returnees to Indonesia, the TNI and Police can 
take part in hard approaching. However, the 
soft approach can be implemented by the 
Ministry of Communication and Information 
with the function of blocking social media 
which contained radical content, by the 
Ministry of Human Rights related to 
strengthening Indonesia’s counter-terrorism 
laws, while PPATK must also be involved in 
dealing with terrorist network funding and 
from NCTA by continuously evaluating and 
optimizing deradicalization and counter-
radicalization programs. As  an actor who has 
prerogative related to the entrance for ISIS 
returnees, the involvement of immigration 
directorate is also essential to prevent the 
issuance of passports and the return of 
Foreign Terrorist Fighter from conflict areas 
abroad. In addition, to prevent the departure 
of Indonesian citizens to Syria to become ISIS 
sympathizers. 
Coordination between institutions is also 
important in prevention, especially the 
cooperation for limiting unknown foreigners 
who will arrive Indonesia. Beside that, the 
prevention of ISIS returnees required support 
from many parties. Because the nature of 
terrorism as a transnational criminal offense, 
good coordination from all the institutions 
mentioned above is very fundamental to 
overcome the problem of ISIS returnees to the 
country which could threaten Indonesia’s 
security and unity. 
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